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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANNIE STRINGAM, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellee, MORRIS MYERS 
v. 
Case No. 20000179-CA 
MORRIS MYERS, ERIN M. STOVALL, 
aka ERIN M. STOVALL, JOHN Priority No* 15 
PATRICK STOVALL, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
An important purpose of findings of fact is to provide a 
basis for review bv the appellate court." Tavlor v. Estate 
of Tavlor. 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah App. 1989) 
[An appellate court will disturb the lower court's 
decision only if the findings are clearly erroneous. Clearly 
erroneous is defined by whether the findings are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, whether the lower court 
correctly apprehended the evidence, or if the appellate court 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. State ex rel. C.R. . 996 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 2000); 
Citv of Bozeman v. Vaneman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Mont. 
1995).] 
As shown following, as well as in appellant Myers' 
opening brief, plaintiff Stringam's findings and judgment 
which rest upon those findings must be set aside because said 
findings are clearly erroneous in that the record is devoid of 
facts and inferences to support the findings and the judgment 
appealed is unsupported by the findings. 
1. The trial court's finding of fact #39 states: lf[t]he 
language in the contract is ambiguous;11 finding #12 states: 
11
 [t]he agreement was so unclear that it reguired judicial 
interpretation as to how to compute the balance due." 
Stringam, at page 40 of her brief, contends that 
,f[t]he District Court correctly determined that the agreement 
is ambiguous and therefore, properly admitted extrinsic 
evidence to interpret the agreement." 
In its findings of fact the trial court fails to identify 
two plausible interpretations of any operative clause in the 
agreement [and did not explain how the Agreement was unclear 
so as to be ambiguous]; this the trial court must do in order 
to conclude that the agreement is ambiguous. Hoffman 
Construction Company v. Fred S. James Co. , 313 Or. 464, 836 
P.2d 703 (1992). The language in the Agreement must be 
construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in 
the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be 
ambiguous in the abstract. Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat. Union 
Fire Ins., 959 P.2d 265, 272-73 (Cal. 1998); Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) 
2. Appellee's brief, at pp. 40-41, " . . . Stringam 
consistently asserted that the Agreement was a lease 
containing an option to buy. . . and "[b]oth Stringam and Erin 
Stovall, the only two original parties to the Agreement, 
testified that the Agreement was a lease/purchase agreement.11 
2 
"In the usual case, the instrument alone will be deemed 
to express the intention of the parties for it is objective, 
not subjective, intent that controls." Watkins v. Petro-
Searchf Inc. P 689 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1992); Sun Oil 
Co.(Delaware) v. Madelev, 626 W.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981). 
Both Stringam's and Erin Stovall's testimony, summarized 
above, only expresses their subjective intent. 
Also, to raise an issue of credibility relative to both 
women, Stringam#s interest is to establish the Agreement as a 
lease/purchase agreement to facilitate her getting the 
property for half its value. ["The courts are to be guided by 
the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, 
*of preventing people from getting other people's property for 
nothing when they purport to be buying it.'" Kelly v. Kosucra, 
358 U.S. 516, 520-21, 79 S.Ct. 429, 430-31, 3 L.Ed.2d 475 
(1959)(quoting Continental Wall Paper Company v. Louis Voighy 
& Sons Company, 212 U.S. 227, 271, 29 S.Ct. 280, 296, 53 L.Ed. 
486 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
Erin Stovall's interest is to establish the Agreement as 
a sale agreement so that she may participate in the sale 
proceeds in accordance with the provisions of her divorce 
decree. 
3. Stringara then states in her appellee's brief, pp. 40-
41, that the quoted provisions of the agreement, i.e., "this 
joint venture contemplates the purchase by First Party 
[Stringam] from Second Party [Erin Stovall] of said property 
3 
for $109,000* * • ." * * * "Second party [Erin Stovall] 
agrees to sell and First Party [Stringam] agrees to buy said 
real property ." and lf* * * [f]inally, on page four, 
paragraph number 11, the Agreement describes the distribution 
of the proceeds in excess of $109,000 if the Home is sold.", 
compel the interpretation by the trial court that the 
Agreement is one of lease/purchase* 
Out of context, which the above is, Stringam's 
interpretation cannot be denied. In context, and with the 
inclusion of the fourth recital ("Whereas, First Party and 
Second Party intend hereby to state their intentions and 
agreement as to the entitlement to and distribution of profits 
in the event of sale of said property which is the ultimate 
purpose of this joint venture,. . . " ) , however, the 
interpretation urged by Stringam would serve to defeat the 
intent and ultimate purpose of the Agreement as expressed in 
the Agreement; and whereby Stringam would be unjustly 
enriched. [Stringam also fails to explain how Stovall's 
agreement to pay taxes and insurance while Stringam has all 
the benefits of ownership of the property supports her theory 
of sale.] To explain further, if Stringam is permitted to 
purchase the property for $109,000 free of the obligations 
under the joint venture arrangement, in accordance with 
paragraph 3., then there would be nothing for the joint 
venture to sell (". . .in the event of sale of said property 
which is the ultimate purpose of this joint venture."). 
4 
The language of the Agreement by itself establishes the 
intent of the parties. Redel's Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 498 
F.2d 95, 100 and n. 6 (5th Cir. 1974). The applicable rule of 
construction is that unambiguous language in a contract should 
be enforced as written. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madelayf 
626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.1981); Eie v. St. Benedicts Hosp.f 
638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). Ordinarily, where the terms of a 
contract are freely agreed upon by the parties, the court's 
duty is to enforce the contract. Hubbard v. Albuquerque Truck 
Center
 P Ltd * , 958 P. 2d 111 (N.M. App 1998) Stringam's 
contention therefore, that the trial court properly denied 
appellant Myers' post-trial motions (r. 955 et seq.) does not 
square with the rule as quoted. 
4. Relative to Stringam's contention that the trial 
court properly allowed Stringam to tender the balloon payment 
to the court during the pendency of the action is no longer a 
consideration. On December 8, 1997 the trial court at 
Stringam's request, entered an order providing that "Plaintiff 
may withdraw her tender of $109,000 from the Court" which she 
did on December 16, 1997, by receipting for and receiving the 
$109,000 she deposited with the court, (r. 164-166). 
Presumably, through simple mathematical calculation, the 
trial court determined the balloon payment to be $134,043.24 
(r. 1000) 
5. In interpreting a contract "we first look to the four 
corners of the document to determine the intent of the 
5 
parties. Wade v. Stanol. 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
6; On the matter of attorney's fees, an award of 
attorney's fees must be based on evidence of reasonableness of 
the requested fees. Both the decision to award such fees and 
the amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Crouse v. Grouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Attorney fees are awardable only if expressly contracted for, 
or provided by statute and if there is evidence as to 
necessity and reasonableness of said fees." Walke v. 
Sandwickf 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976). Findings are required* 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 n* 6. (Utah 
App* 1989) Also, Stringam has provided no evidence of 
necessity and reasonablenes of the requested fees and has 
failed to claim her costs as the rule requires [rule 54(d)(2), 
URCiP]; they are therefore waived. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
7. (A) At page 46 of her appellee's brief, Stringam 
then states that she is permitted an appeal from the January 
31, 2000, and February 4, 2000, orders and judgments, and that 
appellant Myers cannot now question in his appellant's brief 
her right to do so. 
Myers' raises a jurisdictional issue with respect to the 
February 4, 2000 order and judgment which can be raised at any 
time. 
(B) Stringam states as one of the issues on appeal 
that the failure of the trial court to find that Stringam's 
6 
attorney fees were unreasonable in face of the trial court's 
reduction of Stringam's award of attorney's fees, was error. 
To the knowledge of the undersigned, there is no record of the 
trial court having considered this issue at trial or by motion 
for new trial/ rule 59(e) motion, or otherwise. And Stringam, 
at least on this record, did not request finding(s) on the 
issue. An appellate court should not consider Stringam's 
argument on this issue therefore, because it is raised for the 
first time on appeal. Straley v. Halliday, 2000 Ut.App. 38, 
997 P.2d 338. 
Insofar as paragraph 4. of the trial court's January 31, 
2000 order and judgment is concerned, the same did not specify 
the legal basis for the amount of the award nor how the court 
arrived at the precise amount of the award. 
8. On August 1, 2000, appellant Myers submitted a letter 
of supplemental authority which may be helpful in the 
determination of intent regarding a joint venture enterprise. 
It is not intended to be misleading or to be presented outside 
the issues of appellant Myers' appeal. 
In addition, Stringam did not file a response to 
appellant Myers' suplemental authority within seven days as 
the rule requires and therefor has waived any objection she 
might have. See rule 24(i), URAppP. 
9. At page 33 of her appellee's brief, Stringam urges the 
appellate court to dismiss appellant Myers' appeal "for lack 
of juris^iq^ion because Myers' service of his notice on 
7 
Stringam was faulty." 
Stringam attacks Myers appeal on purported jurisdictional 
grounds, viz., ". • •Myers waited a few days [after filing his 
notice of appeal] to mail the Notice to Stringam. . .and Myers 
did not include a certificate of service with his notice of 
appeal." (appellee's brief, at p. 33-34) Stringam does not 
explain how she was prejudiced by the omissions she describes. 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides "* 
* *. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, * * *" The grounds asserted by 
Stringam as jurisdictional for dismissal of appellant's appeal 
do not, therefore, appear to be jurisdictional. 
DATED October 28, 2000. 
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